Abstract. We introduce a new type of cryptographic primitives which enforce high communication or storage complexity. To evaluate these primitives on a random input, one has to engage in a protocol of high communication complexity, or one has to use a lot of storage. Therefore, the ability to compute these primitives constitutes a certain "proof of work," since the computing party is forced to contribute a lot of its communication or storage resources to this task. Such primitives can be used in applications which deal with non-malicious but selfishly resourcemaximizing parties. For example, they can be useful in constructing peerto-peer systems which are robust against so called "free riders." In this paper we define two such primitives, a communication-enforcing signature and a storage-enforcing commitment scheme, and we give constructions for both.
Introduction
linear lower-bounds on communication or storage resources. They can be used to generate a proof of work performed by some party, and are therefore applicable to settings that deal with non-malicious but selfish parties which try to minimize the use of their own resources. For example, they can be applied to auditing file trading or file storage in peer-to-peer networks and thus making such networks robust against free riders.
In this paper we define and give constructions for two new primitives:
-A communication-enforcing signature (CES) . CES is a signature scheme which enforces high communication complexity on the party that signs a message. -A storage-enforcing commitment (SEC) . SEC is a commitment scheme which enforces high storage complexity on the party that commits to a message.
We explain both notions using the following two examples.
Consider an advertising agency that distributes digital ads (e.g., pictures or short videos) to viewers on behalf of advertisers. We assume that viewers are also encouraged to exchange ads among themselves. For example, a viewer might forward an interesting or amusing ad to a friend. Viewers must submit "proofs of download" to the ad agency, which rewards them in proportion to the number of ads they have downloaded. Observe that standard digital signatures are inadequate as proofs of download, since the hash-and-sign paradigm on which they are based implies that knowledge of the digest of a message is sufficient to sign the whole message. Viewers could save on bandwidth by exchanging only the hashes of ads rather than the ads themselves, and claim credit for ads they never downloaded. We propose instead to use communication-enforcing signatures (CES) as proofs of download. CES share the same security properties as standard digital signatures, but offer the added guarantee that, short of leaking his private-key, the signer can only sign a message after exchanging at least as much data with the source of the message as would be required to send the message. In our example, the ad agency could collect CES from viewers and submit them to advertisers for the purpose of auditing the success of an ad campaign.
We now consider another example, to illustrate this time the need for auditing file storage. Assume that a couple entrusts a public notary with their will. The couple does not want to reveal this will to their children, but at the same time they want their children to have the ability to verify that the public notary is storing their will. In essence, these requirements amount to a proof of storage of a secret document. In this situation, our storage-enforcing commitment (SEC) scheme could be used to audit file storage. Indeed, SEC allows the party holding a commitment to ask the party that committed itself to a message to prove that it is still in possession of this message, or, more precisely, that it uses at least as much storage as would be required to store the message. In our example, the notary would give to the children a storage-enforcing commitment to the will, which would enable the children to verify in the future that the notary is not saving on storage by erasing the will.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the rest of this section, we give a brief survey of related work. In section 2, we give a formal definition of communication-enforcing signatures (CES) and propose heuristic constructions for CES. We also show that the ability to compute on encrypted data would imply that CES are not possible. This leads us to believe that heuristic constructions for CES is the best we may hope for. In section 3, we define storage-enforcing commitments (SEC) and give a provably secure SEC construction. We conclude in section 4.
Related work
Much work has been devoted to the study of communication complexity in multiparty computations. Mehlhorn et al. showed in [MS82] that there is a relationship between the communication complexity of a boolean function and the rank of the associated matrix. This relationship was also investigated in [Yao83, NW94] .
However, there are surprisingly few results on communication complexity under cryptographic assumptions. A notable exception are digital signets introduced by Dwork et al. in [DLN96] . Signets are based on a primitive called incompressible functions. A length-increasing function f is incompressible if, in order to communicate f (x) to Bob, Alice must either reveal her secret x to Bob, or else send Bob a message of length Ω(|f (x)|).
CES mirror the properties of incompressible functions in reverse: Alice may either send a short message to Bob (her private key) or receive from Bob the message to be signed. In [DLN96] , the authors conjecture that some functions are incompressible, but leave as an open problem the task of building an incompressible function based on standard cryptographic primitives, or prove that such functions can not exist. Similarly, this paper offers only heuristics for building CES.
We propose a provably secure construction for a storage-enforcing commitment scheme, based conceptually upon Toeplitz matrices. These matrices have also been used for efficient constructions of a MAC [Kra94] and universal hash functions [MNT93] .
Communication-enforcing signature scheme
In this section we define communication-enforcing signatures (CES). We propose a few simple CES schemes with heuristic security. We observe that a signature scheme cannot be provably communication-enforcing if computation on encrypted data were feasible. From a theoretical point of view, this suggests that our heuristic constructions may be the best one can hope for. In practice, we believe that our constructions are good heuristics for enforcing communication complexity as long as there are no efficient methods for computing on encrypted data.
Definition of a CES
A CES scheme has all the properties of a regular signature scheme [GMR88] , but in addition it is also "communication-enforcing". This means that in order to sign a message held by a source S, a signer P must either enable S to sign any message on its behalf, or else engage with S in a protocol of communication complexity equal at least to the length of the message to be signed.
A stronger notion of communication-enforcement would require the message to be computable from the signature, perhaps by an all-powerful machine. However, such a notion could only be satisfied if the length of the signature was at least the length of the message. In contrast, our definition of CES allows for schemes in which the size of the signature is polynomial only in the security parameter, as in standard digital signature schemes. This weaker notion of communication-enforcement appears good enough for our purpose. It creates disincentives for the owner of a private key to avoid the communication complexity associated with downloading a message that it must sign. Indeed, short of revealing his private key, the signer is forced to download some file of size comparable to the message. We can restate this definition in simpler terms as follows. No matter what protocol the signer P and the message source S engage in to produce the signature Sig(M, d) on message M , either the communication complexity of this protocol is at least the size of M , or the signing protocol enables the source to forge signatures. Thus the definition above incorporates the unforgeability notion of [GMR88] .
Implications of computing on encrypted data
It was pointed out in [San01] that if there exists a method for performing general computation on encrypted data then communication-enforcing signature schemes cannot exist. The problem of computing on encrypted data was posed twenty years ago by Yao [Yao82] . If there existed an efficient solution to this problem, a CES scheme could not exist for the following reason. The signer P could send an encryption of its private (signing) key to the source S. S would in turn encrypt the message M and evaluate the function Sig on encrypted inputs to compute an encryption of the output σ = Sig(M, d). This (short) output could then be sent back to P , who can decrypt it to recover the signature σ. Thus P could compute σ without revealing its inputs to S, and the communication complexity of this protocol would be independent of |M |.
Since there is nothing to suggest that it is impossible to compute on encrypted data, we conclude that we cannot hope to prove that a signature scheme is communication-enforcing. The constructions we propose next are only heuristically communication-enforcing.
First heuristic construction for CES: CBC-RSA
A simple implementation of a CES would be to apply a trapdoor permutation to each block of the message in turn. However, such a scheme is impractical because the size of the resulting signature is as long as the input message.
To reduce the output size, we may use a CBC-chain as follows. Assume that we are using the RSA function [RSA77] with k-bit modulus and a hash function H with k-bit long output size, and that the message M is divided into blocks M 1 ...M n each of size k. The prover signs the first block
d mod N , and for each i-th block for i = 2, ..., n, he computes
The resulting communication-enforcing signature is equal to the last block signature C n . Since the block-wise RSA signature operation we use supports messagerecovery, the verifier algorithm can unwind this CBC construction as follows. He
This CBC-chaining construction enforces high communication complexity if we model the private-key RSA permutation as a random oracle which can only be accessed by the party who knows the private key.
The drawback of our CBC-chaining construction is that it relies on a heuristic security argument and has a high computational cost. Indeed the signer needs to perform one private-key operation per block of the message M , where each block is about 1024 bits if we use 1024-bit RSA. This implies that a signer would need to perform some 100,000 RSA signature operations in order to sign a 10 MBytes file.
Another heuristic construction for CES: two-root RSA
In this section we present a signature scheme, which is secure in the random oracle model and heuristically communication-enforcing. The scheme is based on a generalization of the RSA signature scheme [RSA77] .
Consider the following typical implementation of the RSA signature scheme. A signature on a message M is a solution of the following equation in Z N :
where H is a collision-resistant hash function and N is a product of two primes. We generalize this scheme to include more blocks of the message as follows. A signature on a message M = (M 0 , . . . , M n ) is a pair of two distinct roots
where H is a full-domain length-preserving collision-resistant function and N = pq is a product of two prime numbers. The roots x 1 , x 2 are subject to the condition that x 1 − x 2 is coprime with N . Using the Ben-Or algorithm [Ben81] a root of this polynomial, if it exists, can be found in time O(n log n log log n log 2 N ). By the Chinese Remainder Theorem the polynomial has two roots x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z N such that gcd(x 1 − x 2 , N ) = 1 if and only if it has at least two distinct roots both in Z p and Z q . The existence of at least two roots in Z p and Z q are independent events, each with probability between 1/3 and 1/2 [Knu75, section 4.6.2]. Therefore a solution to equation (1) exists with probability between 1/9 and 1/4. As n increases the probability approaches e −2 ≈ .135. We apply this concept to design a signature scheme which is as secure as factoring (in the random oracle model). This is done by introducing chaining between blocks, as follows.
Signing algorithm. The message M is formatted as (M 1 , . . . , M n ), n > 1. The following algorithm is executed by the signer until step 5 succeeds (the expected number of attempts required depends on n and is between 4 and 9).
Step 1. Randomly choose an initial vector IV
Step 5. Find two distinct roots t 1 , t 2 ∈ Z p and two distinct roots s 1 , s 2 ∈ Z q of P (x).
Step 6. Find x 1 , x 2 ∈ Z N satisfying
Step 7. Output the signature (IV, x 1 , x 2 ). Verification algorithm. A signature on a message M = (M 1 , . . . , M n ) is parsed as (IV, x 1 , x 2 ) . The verifier computes C, C 1 , . . . , C n and P (x) ∈ Z N [x] as above and checks that x 1 = x 2 (mod N ). The signature is accepted if P (x 1 ) = 0 (mod N ) and P (x 2 ) = 0 (mod N ).
In the random oracle model this signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks assuming the hardness of factoring. We omit the standard part of the argument in the random oracle model (see [BR93] for an example of a detailed proof) and sketch the reduction from the ability to find two roots of a random polynomial of degree n in Z N [x] to factoring N .
Claim. The problem of finding two distinct roots of a random polynomial of degree n drawn from the uniform distribution on Z N [x] is as difficult as factoring.
Proof Sketch: Suppose there exists an algorithm A that given P (x)
of degree n outputs two distinct roots (x 1 , x 2 ) of P (x) with non-negligible probability ε. We build an algorithm B that uses A to factor N as follows:
Step
Step 3. Compute P (x) = (x − y 1 )(x − y 2 )Q(x).
Step 4. Run A on P (x). Let the output of A be (x 1 , x 2 ).
Step 5. If either of x 1 − y 1 , x 1 − y 2 , x 2 − y 1 , x 2 − y 2 is not zero and not coprime with N , we have found a nontrivial factor of N . The distribution from which Q is drawn in steps 1-2 is off by at most a factor of n 2 from the uniform distribution on polynomials of degree n with at least two roots. Therefore, the probability of success in step 4 is at least ε/n 2 . Notice that along with known roots y 1 , y 2 of Q(x) there exist two unknown roots (y 1 , y 2 ) satisfying
Any one of y 1 , y 2 reveals the factorization of N . The probability that A outputs one of these two values is no less than 1 n 2 −2 . Therefore B succeeds in factoring N with probability at least ε/n 4 . It is interesting to note that it is not known whether a similar signature scheme in which the signature of a message consists of a single root of a polynomial from Z N [x] is secure under any standard assumption.
Heuristically this scheme is communication-enforcing, since it is believed to be hard to find a root of a polynomial without full knowledge of this polynomial.
Storage-enforcing Commitment
In this section we introduce a primitive called storage-enforcing commitment scheme. Its setup is similar to commitment schemes, but the scheme has the additional property that the committer (whom we call the prover) cannot discard the secret it is supposed to store. This problem is trivial if the storage complexity of the verifier or the complexity of its communications with the prover is unbounded. However, we are able to propose a practical storage-enforcing commitment scheme, for which the storage and the amortized communication complexity are independent of the length of the message.
Regular commitment schemes [Blu83] bind the prover to a particular value of a string that is to be kept secret during some stages of the execution of a protocol.
These commitment schemes are not designed to permit repeated verification of a commitment to the same string. Storage-enforcing commitment schemes on the other hand are multi-round protocols that ensure that the prover neither "forgets" nor alters the secret between rounds. Any prover who is able to answer the verifier's challenges must keep the secret, or at least use as much storage space as would be required to store the secret. Formally, we define:
Definition 2 (Storage-enforcing commitment scheme). A storage-enforcing commitment scheme (SEC) is a three-party protocol executed between a message source S, a prover P , and a verifier V . The message source communicates the message M to the prover and the commitment C to the verifier. The verifier V may verify whether the prover is storing the secret by invoking a probabilistic interactive algorithm Check P,V (C, M ). This algorithm may be executed an unlimited number of times. Once the message is revealed, the verifier may check the commitment by running the algorithm Verify(C, M ).
The To illustrate this definition, recall our example from the introduction. A couple entrusts a public notary with their will. The couple doesn't want their children to learn the will, yet the children should be able to verify that the public notary is properly storing the will. These requirements are satisfied by a storage-enforcing commitment scheme, where the notary is the prover and the children are verifiers. The verification protocol enables the children to verify that the notary is still in possession of the will (or at least, that the notary uses at least as much storage space as would be required to store the will), yet it does not leak any information about the will.
Unsatisfactory solutions. We explain here why other possible commitment schemes do not meet the requirements of our example. Consider first that we could have the message source send to the verifier a non-compressing commitment to each block of the message. The verifier stores hashes of all these commitments. To execute the protocol Check, the verifier requests from the prover a commitment to a random block, hashes it and compares it to the hash previously stored. The problem with this approach is that it requires the verifier to store an amount of data (in the form of commitments) which is proportional to the amount of data the prover has to store. This defeats the point of having the prover store the data on behalf of the verifier.
Alternately, instead of storing hashes of all the commitments, the verifier could store a single hash computed on all the commitments concatenated. This approach however requires the prover to send all the commitments each time the protocol Check is executed. This leads to a scheme with unacceptable communication complexity.
Our storage-enforcing commitment scheme
We work in a group G of prime order p with generator g. The order of the group depends on the security parameter λ. Our scheme is based on a variant of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, which we call the n-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman (n-PDDH) assumption.
n-Power Decisional Diffie-Hellman (n-PDDH) assumption. No polynomial-time algorithm can distinguish between the following two distributions with non-negligible advantage over a random guess:
Notice that 2-PDDH is the same as the Decisional Square Exponent DiffieHellman assumption [BDS98, SS01] . We also need a weaker, computational assumption defined below. n-Power Computational Diffie-Hellman (n-PCDH) assumption. No probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm can compute g
with non-negligible probability. The 2-PCDH assumption is equivalent to the Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. It is unknown whether n-PCDH implies (n+1)-PCDH (the converse is obviously true).
Design of the scheme. We limit the size of a message to m blocks, where blocks are interpreted as elements of Z p . Longer messages can be broken into pieces and committed to simultaneously. Let n = 2m + 1 and assume that n-PDDH holds in the group G.
The secret key of the verifier is x randomly chosen from Z p . The corresponding public key is
The commitment phase consists of the following three steps:
Step 1. The verifier publishes the public key PK.
Step 2. The verifier gives a zero-knowledge proof to P that the key is properly constructed, i.e. for any index 1 ≤ i < n the quadruple
Step 3. The message source S formats the message as an m-
p and appends it to the message.
and sends it to the verifier. f 0 ∈ G is the commitment to the message. From the verifier's point of view the blinding block M m+1 is considered as an integral part of the message. For the purpose of computing the storage complexity we include this block into the message.
To check that the prover still has the message, the verifier initiates the following Check protocol:
Step 1. The verifier sends to the prover a challenge 0 ≤ k ≤ m.
Step 2. The prover computes
, where M i is the i th block of the message and sends f k back to the verifier.
Step 3. The verifier checks whether f
If the equality holds, the verifier accepts the proof, otherwise the proof is rejected. The verification phase is trivial-given the messageM , the verifier computeŝ f 0 and compares it to the f 0 received from the message source during the commitment phase.
The storage complexity of the verifier is one group element f 0 and x ∈ Z p . Since the verifier's public key can be reused for multiple messages, the scheme's storage overhead approaches zero on a per-message basis.
Proof of this commitment scheme
The commitment scheme described above is unconditionally concealing and satisfies the binding property against a computationally-bounded adversary under the n-PCDH assumption. Our proofs are generalizations of [Ped91] .
Computational binding. Suppose that the message source can find two messages that may be committed to the same string C. This means that, for a given public key g 1 , . . . , g n , S can find two messages M = (M 1 , . . . , M m ) and
It follows that the following equation is satisfied:
Since M m , M m = 0 (mod p) and M = M , the two sides of the equation are not identical. Therefore the equation can be solved for x in quasi-linear time [Ben81] . This violates the n-PCDH assumption. Perfect concealing. The concealing property holds because the only information the verifier learns about the message prior to the opening phase is determined by the value of m+1 i=1 M i x i mod p, which is independent of the message due to the blinding block M m+1 . This property is unconditional and holds against a computationally unbounded verifier.
Storage-enforcing. The following theorem proves that the scheme is storageenforcing.
Theorem 1. Any proverP that passes the test
Check with probability α > 0 has storage complexity at least α|M | under the n-PDDH assumption. The probability is taken over messages drawn from the uniform distribution on {0, 1} |M | , the public key of the verifier, and all coin tosses.
Proof. We present the proof in two parts. First, we show (under the n-PDDH assumption) that the storage complexity of the prover and his probability of success are independent on whether the public key is chosen from R n or P n . Second, we demonstrate that in order to pass the test with probability α when the key comes from R n , the prover must have storage complexity at least α|M |. The second part of the proof is information-theoretic and unconditional.
We model the prover at different points in time as two separate algorithmsP 1 andP 2 . These two algorithms communicate by means of a bit string output bŷ P 1 and received byP 2 . The length of this string is at least the storage complexity of the prover.
Suppose we are given an instance of the n-PDDH problem: we must decide whether the tuple (g 1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n belongs to P n or R n . The claim is that a prover with storage complexity less than α|M | can be used as a distinguisher between these two distributions. We set the public key of the verifier to be the n- tuple (g 1 , . . . , g n ) and simulate the prover's view such that the only difference between this game and a real execution of the scheme is the type of the tuple.
The zero-knowledge proof of the key's correctness can be simulated using standard techniques. We assume that the transcript of the proof is given toP .
Let the message M be a random string consisting of m+1 blocks. The message is known and therefore we can check the responses ofP by a direct computation
Mi i+k without knowing x or even without being aware of whether the public key has the right structure. This simulates perfectly the prover's view and enables us to check his output.
If the prover has probability α of passing the test when the public key is constructed correctly but has a different probability of success when the key is a random n-tuple, this prover can be used as a distinguisher between the two distributions. Therefore his probability of success in either case is negligibly close to α.
Similarly, the storage complexity, modelled as the communication complexity betweenP 1 andP 2 , is an observable characteristic. Therefore it must be the same for the keys drawn from R n and P n . Otherwise we could use the observable difference between the storage complexity to break the n-PDDH assumption.
We have just proved thatP must be able to pass the test Check with the same probability and storage complexity regardless of whether PK is properly constructed or drawn from PK R ← R n . We now show that in order to pass the test with a key chosen from R n the prover must have storage complexity at least α|M |, where α is the probability of success.
Consider the following random tuple:
To pass the test the prover must compute
k. We claim that the vector (f 0 , . . . , f m ) has guessing entropy |M |. ForP 2 to reproduce a value from this list with probability at least α its input must be at least α|M | bit long. Let the discrete logarithms of (f 0 , . . . , f m ) to the base g be (b 0 , . . . , b m ). It is easy to see that
where · denotes the scalar product of two vectors from Z (a 1 , . . . , a n ). The following lemma proves that this matrix is non-singular with overwhelming probability 1 .
Lemma 1. The Toeplitz matrix A defined above has full rank with probability at least 1 − n p over all tuples (a 1 , . . . , a n ) randomly chosen from Z n p .
Proof. We use the Schwartz Lemma [Sch80] , which can be briefly stated as follows:
Consider a non-trivial multivariate polynomial of degree n defined on variables from Z p . Given a random assignment to the variables, this polynomial evaluates to zero with probability at most 1 − n/p.
Since in this case the verifier does not have secret data, the scheme can be used in a scenario where the verifier outsources his entire storage to the prover (the public key and the commitment must be signed and come with certificates).
This scheme is provably secure in the generic algorithm model [Sho97] . This is a weaker security argument, but for many practical protocols it is often the only guarantee we have (see [Sch00] for a survey of this situation).
The first example of a group in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is easy while its computational counterpart is hard was recently proposed by Joux and Nguyen [JN01] . It is a group of points on an elliptic curve of a special type, in which the Weil pairing is non-trivial and efficiently computable. We refer the interested reader to [BF01] for details on how to build a practical cryptographic scheme from the Weil pairing.
Finally, we would like to mention that a scheme with an asymptotically worse communication complexity but which is otherwise much more practical has been reported to us by David Wagner [Wag02] . The message source expands the message using a one-way length-increasing transformation, constructs a Merkle hash tree on the result of this expansion and sends the root of the tree to the verifier. Later, the verifier can check whether the prover still has the message by requesting a random block of the expanded image of the message and a full path in the hash tree from the root to this random block.
Conclusion and Further Work
We have introduced cryptographic primitives enforcing communication and storage complexity and proposed constructions for them. A general direction for future work would be to further investigate the connections between communication complexity and cryptographic assumptions.
